Air-to-ground quantum communication by Nauerth, Sebastian et al.
Air to Ground Quantum Communication
Sebastian Nauerth1*, Florian Moll2, Markus Rau1, Christian Fuchs2, Joachim
Horwath2, Stefan Frick1 and Harald Weinfurter1,3
1Fakula¨t fu¨r Physik, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universita¨t, 80799 Mu¨nchen, Germany
2Institut fu¨r Kommunikation und Navigation, Deutsches Zentrum fu¨r Luft- und Raumfahrt e.V. (DLR), 82234 Weßling, Germany
3Max-Planck-Institut fu¨r Quantenoptik, 80539 Garching, Germany
*email: sebastian.nauerth@lmu.de
Quantum key distribution1,2 (QKD) is the ﬁrst commercial application in the new
ﬁeld of quantum information with ﬁrst routine applications in governmental and ﬁnan-
cial sectors3 and with successful demonstrations of trusted node networks4,5. Today,
the grand goal is eﬃcient long range key distribution either via quantum repeaters6 or
via satellites7–9 in order to enable global secure communication. On the way to QKD
via satellites a free-space demonstration of secure key distribution was performed over
144 km between two ground stations10. This scenario is comparable to links between
satellites in low earth orbits (LEO) and ground stations with respect to both atten-
uation and ﬂuctuations. However, we still miss key exchange with rapidly moving
platforms. Here we prove for the ﬁrst time the feasibility of BB84 quantum key distri-
bution between an airplane and a ground station. Establishing a stable and low noise
quantum communication channel with the plane moving with 290 km/h at a distance
of 20 km, i.e., 4 mrad/s, our results are representative for typical communication links
to satellites11 or to high altitude platforms.
Quantum key distribution provides a whole new level of information security. Any infor-
mation gained by eavesdropping on the quantum channel can be quantiﬁed by the observed
transmission noise, the quantum bit error ratio (QBER)12. Security proofs, solely based on
the laws of quantum mechanics, show how to determine the necessary amount of privacy
ampliﬁcation (i.e., key shrinkage according to the QBER) to eliminate the knowledge of
a possible adversary13. Starting with a ﬁrst quantum channel of 30 cm length in 198914
quantum key distribution quickly was enabled on successively longer distances. Two main
branches for communicating qubits encoded with quantum states of light were established:
either via telecom ﬁber channels or via free-space transmission. In both cases increasing at-
tenuation and noise limit the maximum distance for a successful key distribution to typically
150−200 km10,15,16. So far, long range free-space quantum communication experiments used
a direct line of sight either between two Canary Islands (144 km) or across a lake in China
(95 km) to demonstrate free-space QKD, entanglement distribution10,17–19, or quantum tele-
portation20,21. In spite of this remarkable progress, all quantum communication so far was
performed with stationary systems only. Contrary, for classical optical free-space commu-
nication high bandwidth links to aircrafts and satellites have been shown to be feasible in
recent years11,22,23.
Here we report on an experiment combining recent advances in classical and in quan-
tum optical technologies to demonstrate the feasibility of quantum key distribution from
an airplane to ground (ﬁg. 1). Major challenges in this experiment are the higher pointing
requirements compared to classical free-space communication, the development of a precise
compensation technique to account for the relative rotations of airborne and ground station
qubit encoding bases, and the integration of the QKD hardware into an existing communi-
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cation system.
The host system for integration of the QKD quantum channel is the ”free-space experi-
mental laser terminal 2” (FELT2) in a Donier 228 turboprop aircraft and the optical ground
station (OGS) operated by the German Aerospace Center Oberpfaﬀenhofen22,24 (ﬁg. 1). In-
side the airplane all lasers and sensors together with electronics for tracking, telemetry and
data transmission are built on a 500 mm × 800 mm optical bench shock mounted to the
seat rails. Light is guided via a short tunnel to the coarse pointing assembly (exit aperture
35 mm) in a quartz half dome outside the aircraft fuselage (ﬁg. 1a). The ground station, also
capable of optical communication with satellites11, consists of a 40 cm Cassegrain telescope,
with the respective laser and receiver systems mounted on an optical breadboard moving
with the telescope22 (ﬁg. 1c, for further details see methods).
An initial orientation of the telescopes is accomplished via a GPS based tracking system
where the aircraft transmits its position to ground using a low rate UHF telemetry link.
With this initial direction, a beacon laser from the ground station illuminates the aircraft,
where the FELT2 at the same time performs a scan to acquire the laser signal with its
telescope (ﬁg. 1d shows a scheme of the optics and electronics system). The FELT2 now
keeps tracking on this signal and so does the optical ground station using the communication
laser sent down from the aircraft as beacon source.
While in classical free-space communication the transmitted power can be adjusted within
a wide range to compensate coupling loss between transmitter and receiver, for QKD the
average intensity per pulse sent over the quantum channel has to be at the single photon
level, requiring signiﬁcantly higher link eﬃciencies. Thus, we had to narrow down the QKD
beam to a divergence of ≈ 180 μrad (3.4 m diameter at a distance of 20 km, limited by
the maximum usable aperture of 15 mm and the beam path in the FELT2 optics), much
smaller than the communication beam which was allowed a divergence of 2.6 mrad (diameter
50 m) in this scenario. To guarantee a stable link with this smaller divergence, ﬁne pointing
assemblies were implemented and optimized on both sides. Each of them consisted of a
fast actuated mirror in a control loop with a position sensitive sensor detecting the beacon
light (voice-coil mounted mirror / quadrant photodiode in FELT2 and piezo driven mirror
/ camera in the OGS). From independent analysis using the coarse pointing camera, we can
specify an upper bound of 150 μrad for the FPA precision even in the presence of engine
vibrations aboard the aircraft.
Another important prerequisite for this experiment arises from the polarization encoding
used. The relative motion between sender and receiver results in a relative rotation between
their coordinate systems. In addition, the numerous mirrors and coatings introduce fur-
ther birefringent phases. For that reason a motorized polarization controller was developed,
which uses three waveplates to compensate for arbitrary polarization rotations. All birefrin-
gence was measured beforehand and modeled as a function of the FELT2 telescope angular
positions, which were also broadcast via the UHF link.
After enabling an eﬃcient and stable quantum channel the QKD sender and receiver
had to be integrated directly into the existing communication system. With the FELT2
covered by a safety hood and the OGS moving continuously there was no possibility for
readjustments during ﬂight. Thus, the QKD modules had to be highly robust against vi-
brations or temperature changes in the plane and at the OGS. A transmitter module (Alice,
80 × 100 × 150 mm3) for polarization encoded, attenuated pulse QKD25,26 (ﬁg. 2a) was
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designed to ﬁt into the FELT2 terminal (ﬁg. 2b). For this proof of principle experiment,
the classical optical link was able of unidirectional communication only. To still enable an
immediate analysis of the performance even without classical communication between Alice
and Bob, we sent a continuous repetition of the four states instead of a random bit string. To
switch between alignment and QKD mode intensities, an attenuator is mounted on a servo
arm. Additionally, the servo can place a photo diode in the beam path enabling calibration
of the pulse intensity by individually tuning the exact brightness of the four diodes elec-
tronically. At the ground station (Bob) a dichroic mirror was used to separate the classical
and quantum communication wavelengths. The polarization controller was mounted in the
quantum channel followed by a four channel QKD receiver25 analyzing the incoming pulses
(ﬁg. 2c+d).
The co-alignment of the classical and quantum channels is utterly important as the
direction of the QKD beam is not sensed by the tracking control loop. Therefore, the
overlap was readjusted before every ﬂight over a test distance of 330 m. In ﬂight, ﬁrst a
ﬁne tuning of the pointing was done with the higher pulse intensity from the QKD-system:
A small oﬀset added in the FELT2 ﬁne pointing allowed to optimize the eﬃciency of the
QKD transmission, while the classical link, in this demonstration used for synchronization,
was unaﬀected due to the much higher divergence of the FELT2 laser. Preparations were
ﬁnished by a recalibration of Alice’s pulse intensities to 0.5 photons/pulse.
The airborne QKD transmission was performed shortly after sunset on a roughly circular
path around the OGS with a radius of 20 km (ﬁg. 1b, see methods). The new bidirectional
ﬁne pointing enabled continuous precise tracking for the whole aircraft passage time of
10 min (ﬁg. 3). We achieved an overall link eﬃciency of about −38 dB from outside Alice’s
terminal to Bob’s detections. This value includes the detector eﬃciency of about −4 dB and
the losses on the main and secondary telescope mirror, which, using protected aluminum
coatings, contribute with at least −2 dB at the QKD wavelength. In addition, signals which
were sampled during the ﬂashes from the anti collision lights had to be discarded. Yet, as
these ﬂashes are only about 1.5 ms long this reduction does not contribute noteworthily to
the overall attenuation. Bob’s detectors showed a background rate of about 1000 s−1 each
(with dark counts and stray light contributing about equally), while the overall signal count
rate was around 800 s−1. With time ﬁltering of Δt = 500 ps we achieved a mean sifted key
rate of 145 bit/s with a QBER of 4.8 %, largely determined by the detector background
counts. The technical error27 of signal events contributed only 1.8 % to the QBER. This
proves very precise dynamic polarization compensation of the changing aircraft and mirror
orientations. During one passage, we were able to gather 80 kbit of sifted key in total. A
decoy protocol27,28, necessary to detect eavesdropping on attenuated light pulses, was not
implemented here. However, thorough analysis of the data showed that with additional
decoy and vacuum pulses one can obtain an asymptotically secure key at a rate of 7.9 bit/s
(see methods).
In summary, we demonstrate the possibility of a BB84 key exchange to a fast moving
airborne platform. This was possible using an advanced pointing and tracking system, which
guaranteed stable transmission of QKD signals at the single photon level and which will
signiﬁcantly improve the performance of future applications of the classical communication
link, too. We were able to successfully compensate for mutual rotations of sender and
receiver inherent to an airborne scenario and thus achieved a small QBER. Furthermore,
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by integrating QKD hardware into an existing communication system, we demonstrate the
suitability of QKD as an add-on for a variety of optical and point-to-point radio links. Larger
apertures, particularly for the airborne terminal, and quieter single photon detectors will
allow to increase the key rate. Given the high angular speed our demonstration achieved a
key milestone towards QKD to satellites, high altitude platforms or intercontinental planes
which together will form the basis for an eﬃcient trusted node network enabling secure
communication on a global scale.
Methods
transmitter and receiver telescopes: The light pulses encoding the QKD states generated
in the Alice module are coupled using a dichroic mirror to the terminal’s 1:2 telescope with an exit
aperture of 35 mm29. As the QKD beam is fed adjacent to the FELT2 beacon into the telescope,
only a diameter of 15 mm of the whole aperture is available. In between its two lenses, a coude´
type coarse pointing assembly is installed.
The 40 cm Cassegrain telescope (40 : 1) of the OGS is followed by an additional beam com-
pression of 2 : 1 before the light is focused onto the receiver diodes (diameter of 500 μm) with a
focal length of 75 mm. The resulting eﬀective focal length of 6 m deﬁnes a ﬁeld of view of 83 μrad
for the Bob module.
ﬂight campaign: The experimental ﬂight campaign was scheduled around new moon. While
the ﬁrst day was dedicated to the assembly of the system in the aircraft and its certiﬁcation, in
the following seven days the aircraft was available for ﬂight tests. On two days, ﬂights had to be
aborted due to insuﬃcient weather conditions for aircraft operation under visual ﬂight rules and
technical problems inhibited two further starts. Yet, three out of four planned ﬂights could be
carried out shortly after sunset (≈18:00) until the night ﬂight ban (21:00). On the ﬁrst ﬂight, the
pointing system was optimized and on the second ﬂight a link with bright pulses (50 photons/pulse)
could be achieved between the QKD modules. The quantum key distribution reported here was
performed on the last day of the campaign. During this trial it was slightly hazy under a high
closed cloud cover which limited the aircraft altitude to 1100 m above ground.
next steps In summary, not yet implemented in this proof-of-principle demonstration are a bidi-
rectional classical communication channel with online sifting and a quantum source of randomness
in order to produce shared, secret random numbers. Additionally, enabling varying intensities at
the laser diodes allows for an analysis using a decoy state protocol. Future improvements, to enable
a secure key exchange even for short transmission durations will comprise better telescope coupling
and higher repetition rates.
key analysis: In the analysis of the secure key rate we assume the implementation of a decoy
protocol with one weak decoy intensity ν and vacuum pulses in addition to the signal pulses with
intensity μ. Information leakage due to side channels (e.g. Laser diode emission times, frequency
mismatch, mode overlap) is not taken into account here. Due to variations in the detection eﬃcien-
cies, the sifted key exhibits a bias of 58 % ones. Balancing the detectors would reduce the sifted
key by 16 %.
For a decoy protocol one obtains for the lower bound R of the secure key rate13,27,28:
R ≥ 1
2
(
−Qμf(Eμ)H2(Eμ) +QL1 (1−H2(eU1 ))
)
(1)
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Where Qμ is the gain
27 of signal states, and QL1 the gain of single photon pulses. Eμ is the overall
QBER observed and eU1 is the error rate of single photon states. H2(x) = −x log2(x) − (1 −
x) log2(1 − x) is the binary entropy function and f models the eﬃciency of the error correction
protocol relative to the Shannon limit30. The factor 1/2 is intrinsic to the BB84 protocol only
providing useful results in case of matching bases. Note, however, that this factor can be overcome
for long keys31. The superscripted values can not be measured directly. The decoy theory, however,
provides upper (“U”) and lower (“L”) bounds. For the so called vacuum+weak decoy scheme27
QL1 evaluates to
QL1 =
μ2e−μ
μν − ν2
(
Qνe
ν −Qμeμ ν
2
μ2
− μ
2 − ν2
μ2
Qvac
)
≤ Q1 (2)
with the gain of decoy (Qν) and vacuum (Qvac) states. e
U
1 can be written as
eU1 =
EμQμ − 1/2Qvace−μ
QL1
≥ e1. (3)
In the experiment we observed values of Qμ = 2.86 × 10−5, Qvac = 1.75 × 10−6, and a QBER of
Eμ = 4.77 % for a mean signal pulse intensity of μ = 0.5 photons/pulse. Within 575 s usable
transmission time 164, 617 pulses could be registered by Bob resulting in a channel attenuation of
η = 42.7 dB. Note that this value indicates the attenuation for true single photons, the observed
attenuation for pulses with poissonian distributed photon numbers is slightly diﬀerent due to the
threshold behavior of the detectors27. With an assumed weak decoy intensity of ν = 0.076 this
leads to an asymptotically secure bit rate of 7.9 bit/s Here the fraction of decoy and vacuum pulses
of all sent pulses is 12.8 % and 9.5 % respectively.
Given the limited length of the key, with worst case estimations32 of one standard deviation
for the statistical error of the QBER and all gain values a key is produced at a rate of 4.8 bit/s,
for two standard deviations the secure key rate almost vanishes. Recent more rigorous approaches
to incorporate ﬁnite key eﬀects with decoy state QKD33–35 suggest that more then 106 detected
signals are necessary to obtain a secret key. Especially with respect to satellite based applica-
tions, limited transmission times and thus ﬁnite data sets are a challenge in achieving security.
Increased repetition rates in the GHz regime and better optics, however, still oﬀer much room for
improvements of the raw data rates.
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Figure 1: Overview of the classical communication system of the German Aerospace Center’s
Institute of Communications and Navigation. Initially developed to provide eﬃcient commu-
nication for large area monitoring22 it is able to provide a stable link using optical tracking
with beacon lasers on ground station and aircraft side. a, Dornier 228 used in this experiment
with the inset showing the optical dome housing the coarse pointing assembly. b, Airplane
track with the red section indicating the positions during QKD-transmission. c, Optical
Ground Station telescope. d, Sketch of airborne and ground terminal with integrated QKD
system (colored boxes). Laser diode and Erbium doped ﬁber ampliﬁer (LD EDFA), inertial
measurement unit (IMU), digital signal processor (DSP), wide ﬁeld of view (WFoV) camera,
narrow ﬁeld of view (NFoV) camera, four quadrant diode (4QD), coarse pointing assembly
(CPA), ﬁne pointing assembly (FPA), ﬁber laser (FL), and receiver front-end (RFE).
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Figure 2: QKD and classical communication hardware. a, Illustration of the Alice module.
Four laser diodes emit short pulses (1 ns, 10 MHz, 850 nm). Their light is overlapped using
(polarizing) beam splitters (BS, PBS) in a spatial ﬁlter. A half wave plate (λ/2) is used to
set the angle between the two BB84 bases. Two precision mounted mirrors and a dichroic
mirror are used to overlap the 850 nm output with the classical link (1550 nm). b, Photo of
the module mounted in the FELT2 terminal. For safety reasons the FELT2 has to be covered
during ﬂight by a ﬁberglass hood and is then controlled via Ethernet and USB using laptops
only. c, Design of the Bob module and the free-space polarization controller (waveplates λ/4,
λ/2). Four avalanche photo diodes (APD) analyze the state of the QKD-signals randomly
in the H/V and +/- 45◦ basis. d, the optical bench attached to the back of the OGS main
mirror with the Bob module and polarization controller mounted in the upper part. The
incoming beam from the telescope ﬁrst hits the mirror of the ﬁne pointing assembly (FPA)
and is then divided spectraly at the dichroic mirror (DCM). While the 1550 nm light from the
aircraft beacon is analyzed to maintain the pointing and recover classical data, the 850 nm
signal is directed to the QKD analysis behind an interference ﬁlter (FWHM 10 nm).
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Figure 3: Count rates registered during one aircraft passage (duration 10 minutes and 4 sec-
onds). The raw detector event rate (red) is dominated by the background from the anti
collision ﬂashes of ≈ 1.5 ms length. One can clearly distinguish between the ﬂash light
close to the terminal dome and the other one at the back of the aircraft. For the analysis
the detection events where ﬁltered to remove this background by a simple rate threshold.
The sifted key rate (green) and the QBER (blue) are given as averages over intervals of 1 s
respectively. The solid lines show the mean value of the whole data.
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